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DIGITAL FINANCE INCLUSION AND THE MOBILE MONEY “SOCIAL” 







Financial technology or fintech initiatives are gaining increasing global attention as instruments 
for financial inclusion and economic and social development. Among such initiatives, mobile-
phone-enabled money transfer systems, or “mobile money”, have been particularly acclaimed 
for facilitating access to financial services and creating opportunities for the so-called 
“unbanked poor”. One of the first and most-discussed mobile money projects to date is M-Pesa 
in Kenya, a digital payment system which is now used by over 70 per cent of the Kenyan 
population across a variety of sectors including finance, commerce, education, health, and 
social welfare. M-Pesa is premised on a narrative of social entrepreneurship and has 
increasingly embraced the idea of philanthrocapitalism, promoting the logic that digital 
financial inclusion can simultaneously address social problems and produce profit. This paper 
brings together socio-legal enquiry and international political economy analysis to illustrate the 
institutional arrangements underpinning the development of M-Pesa and examine some of the 
projects built on its infrastructure. It argues that social entrepreneurship promotes a logic of 
opportunity rather than a politics of redistribution, favouring mobile money providers and the 
institutions involved in the mobile money social business over improving the lives of the 
intended beneficiaries, namely the unbanked poor. 
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1. Introduction  
 
In March 2007 Kenya launched one of the first and so far most acclaimed mobile-phone-
enabled money transfer systems, M-Pesa (from M for mobile, and pesa, the Swahili word for 
money). The idea of mobile money originated from people’s practice of transferring prepaid 
airtime following the rapid spread of mobile phones in African countries, and the M-Pesa 
platform was realised via a public-private partnership between the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) and the UK-based telecommunications company Vodafone 
and its local partner Safaricom. M-Pesa has grown at a phenomenal rate, rapidly reaching over 
70 per cent of the Kenyan population. According to a series of surveys coordinated by Financial 
Sector Deepening Kenya (FSD, 2017, 2009, 2013, 2019), the number of people in the country 
with access to formal financial services including mobile money increased from about 20 per 
cent in 2006 to 80 per cent in 2019. M-Pesa has captured global attention as a successful digital 
financial inclusion project that can contribute to economic growth and to the achievement of 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) which replaced the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) in 2015.2  
 
The link between financial inclusion and development is premised on the assumption that 
people, particularly the poor and the marginalised who do not have access to formal financial 
services such as credit, savings, insurance and money transfers, are in need of such services to 
cope with their everyday needs and, possibly, improve their livelihoods, particularly in 
countries with limited infrastructure and resources. Financial technology (fintech) projects 
such as mobile money have been increasingly acclaimed as convenient, secure and efficient 
                                               
2 The Sustainable Development Goals replaced the Millennium Development Goals as a set of development 
objectives supported by specific targets and indicators, to be achieved through global cooperation. The MDGs 
were adopted in 2000 with the aim of reaching them by 2015. Although the MDGs Report of 2015 describes 
them as ‘the most successful anti-poverty movement in history’, the goals have not been attained. The post-2015 
development agenda builds upon the MDGs and led to the adoption of the SDGs in 2015, with the aim of 
achieving these by 2030. See General Assembly, Transforming Our World: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 




ways of providing access to formal financial services for those excluded from mainstream 
banking (see for example Mas and Morawczynski 2009; Mas and Radcliff 2010; Jack and Suri 
2011, 2014, 2016). This idea has been supported by international organisations, financial 
institutions, governments, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and philanthropic 
foundations, which use the term “unbanked poor”, implying a nexus between financial 
exclusion and the perpetuation of poverty. Access to financial services is not considered more 
important than access to basic resources such as food, water, healthcare and education, but it 
is seen as useful or even necessary to achieve these social goals. 
 
This paper contributes to the growing critical debate on digital financial inclusion (see Gabor 
and Brooks 2016; Bateman, Duvendack and Loubere 2019) that questions M-Pesa’s social 
entrepreneurship narrative, namely the logic that business models can simultaneously address 
social problems while making profits. It brings together socio-legal enquiry and international 
political economy analysis, and draws on insights from law and development, critical 
development studies and fieldwork conducted in Nairobi, Kenya. This methodological 
approach aims to capture the “interconnectedness” (Perry-Kessaris 2015) that characterises the 
intersections between the global and local social, economic and legal aspects of the M-Pesa 
system. The fieldwork served as a foundation from which to understand the context and 
functioning of M-Pesa and to identify the key aspects of its digital, physical and legal 
infrastructure. It involved participant observations, focus groups of low-income M-Pesa users 
and interviews with financial institutions, mobile network operators (MNOs) and regulators.3 
The socio-legal enquiry examines the structure, purpose and implications of the institutional 
and regulatory arrangements of M-Pesa, making a distinction between its inclusionary 
techniques and its potential to improve the condition of the unbanked poor. This analysis cannot 
be detached from a consideration of the broader political economic context of M-Pesa, shaped 
by colonialism and development interventions, which created both the need and the necessary 
conditions for M-Pesa.  
 
                                               
3 The fieldwork was conducted in 2012 and 2013 and followed up in 2015. It involved six focus groups, each 
with five to seven informants, in Kawangware, Ngando and Mathare areas, and a final discussion with one or 
two informants from each group on the most relevant issues to emerge from the fieldwork; observation and 
semi-structured interviews with twenty-eight M-Pesa agents, fourteen in Kawangware district and fourteen in 
Ngando district; and twenty-seven semi-structured interviews with relevant institutions including women’s 
rights organisations, financial institutions, MNOs and mobile-money-related institutions, governmental and non-




This paper argues that M-Pesa is premised on a narrative of social entrepreneurship and based 
on a logic of entrepreneurial opportunity rather than a politics of redistribution. The M-Pesa 
platform has been used to provide the unbanked poor with a variety of opportunities to access 
financial services and potentially improve their livelihoods. This logic of opportunity is 
supported by the decontextualized idea that poor people should be the architects of their own 
development, while at the same time targeting them as consumers for private profit. The 
opportunities that M-Pesa offers in fact correspond to a secure source of profit for the mobile 
money providers, profit which is not redistributed to provide the unbanked poor with the 
necessary resources to enable them to really take advantage of financial services. In other 
words, M-Pesa treats digital financial inclusion as an instrument for development and private 
profit without contributing to addressing the causes of financial exclusion, such as lack of 
resources and an irregular income.  
 
To develop this argument the first section examines the relationship between financial 
inclusion and social entrepreneurship, and locates the development of M-Pesa within the 
increasingly influential narrative of philanthrocapitalism, a type of philanthropy that emulates 
for-profit entrepreneurship in the capitalist world. The second section analyses the institutional 
arrangements that have contributed to the rapid development of M-Pesa. It illustrates how the 
M-Pesa infrastructure allows the making of private profits through fees and how its lenient 
regulatory framework has permitted the proliferation of mobile money providers and services. 
The third section looks more specifically at three mobile-money-enabled products and services: 
M-KOPA, Grundfos-Lifelink and HELP, and the philanthrocapitalist logic underpinning these. 
It explains how these projects contribute to the individualisation and financialisation of social 
problems, creating profits for the providers and institutions involved in the “social business” 
of mobile money. 
 
 
2. Financial Inclusion and the Narratives of Mobile Money: From Social 
Entrepreneurship to Philanthrocapitalism 
The international development project has increasingly moved from considering the poor as 
beneficiaries of aid and development interventions to viewing them as actors, consumers and 
entrepreneurs who are responsible for their own livelihood (Rankin 2002; Elyachar 2012). This 
idea has found its conceptual premises in Sen’s capability approach (Sen 2006) and has been 




institutions, this approach does not consider the role of colonialism in contributing to unequal 
structural conditions and ultimately to poverty, and instead focuses on providing poor people 
with opportunities to be architects of their own development.  Financial inclusion has played a 
key role in this shift, promoted as one of these opportunities. This section provides an overview 
of the role of financial inclusion in the international development project, examines its link to 
the evolving narrative of philanthrocapitalism in development discourse and locates the rise of 
mobile money within this narrative.  
 
2.1 Financial Inclusion: From Microcredit to Universal Financial Inclusion 
The neoliberal development agenda adopted by International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World 
Bank that introduced the SAPs in 1980s and 1990s substituted donor-funded and state-led 
poverty lending programmes with microcredit (Rankin 2014, 553), holding borrowers fully 
accountable for repaying their loans.4 Microcredit, modelled around Yunus’ experiment in 
Bangladesh (Yunus 1999), involves the extension of small collateral-free loans to jointly-liable 
groups of poor women (Rahman 1999), to be used for income generating activities in the form 
of micro-entrepreneurship. Various studies showed that SAP’s focus on marketisation, cuts to 
public expenditure and the privatisation of social services increased the need for microcredit 
not only for micro-entrepreneurship, but also to access food and basic resources, creating 
inequality and possible circuits of debt for poorer households (Mayoux 2001; Taylor 2012).  
 
Following the criticism of SAP and the focus on social goals such as poverty reduction 
highlighted in the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Rittich 2006), microcredit 
was promoted as an instrument to allow poor people to realise their own economic and social 
development (Yunus 2008). The term “microcredit” has gradually been replaced by 
“microfinance”, referring to a broad range of financial products beyond credit for 
microenterprises and including savings, insurance and payment services (Armendariz and 
Morduch 2010). Although the two terms are often used interchangeably, with the change in 
language came a change in orientation from the consideration of microcredit schemes as mere 
development initiatives to more commercially-oriented, self-sustaining and regulated 
microfinance institutions that function according to financial markets (Robinson 2001, 22; 
                                               
4 SAPs were a package of loans to developing countries conditional on the adoption of neoliberal policies 
imposed on them by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in the 1980s and 1990s. These 
policies included measures to stabilise, liberalise and globalise economies by lowering barriers to foreign 





Johnson and Arnold 2012). Importantly, however, while microcredit and microfinance 
schemes have been promoted as more effective and sustainable ways of achieving development 
than state-subsidised credit, they remain largely dependent on external funding provided by 
donors and increasingly by the private sector. For this reason the public sector has increasingly 
partnered with the private sector to offer microfinance and, more recently, other financial 
inclusion programmes.  
 
The shift towards universal financial inclusion in the years following the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis (Soederberg 2013, 2014) has seen the increasing involvement of the private sector in 
defining and providing new forms of financial service delivery. The global financial inclusion 
agenda has been embraced by globally influential institutions such as G20, IMF, World Bank, 
World Economic Forum and UN Capital Development Fund (UNCDF), the Gates Foundation 
as well as emerging institutions in the field such as Financial Sector Deepening (FSD) Kenya; 
the Groupe Speciale Mobile Association (GSMA) representing mobile network operators 
(MNO); and the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI) representing regulators in the Global 
South. They support the idea of financial innovation capable of reaching the financially 
excluded via routes such as branchless banking, mobile and payment services provided by retail 
outlets in grocery stores, pharmacies, kiosks, and petrol stations, among others.5 M-Pesa and 
mobile money more generally have become an example of digital financial innovation 
contributing to social goals while producing profits that would make the project sustainable.  
 
2.2 Business and Development: From Social Entrepreneurship to Philanthrocapitalism  
Combining profit with social interests is the core aspect of the narrative of social 
entrepreneurship. The term originated in the US and was popularised in the 1980s by Bill 
Drayton, the founder of the American non-profit organisation Ashoka when he funded 
“Changemakers”, a group of individuals working for social gain (McGoey 2015, 65). The 
concept was later embraced by Klaus Schwab, the founder of the World Economic Forum 
(WEF), who in 1998 set up the Schwab Foundation for Social Entrepreneurship, and since then 
it has been increasingly used to denote socially-motivated business initiatives in the Global 
North as well as development projects in the South. The aim of social entrepreneurship is to 
achieve social objectives, usually more vaguely defined as “missions”, by adopting a novel, 
                                               
5 See for instance G20 Innovative Financial Inclusion Expert Group, Innovative Financial Inclusion: Principles 
and Report on Innovative Financial Inclusion, 2010. < https://www.gpfi.org/publications/principles-and-report-




effective and efficient business logic and method (Nichollson 2006, 2–3). This can consist, for 
instance, of new partnerships across the public, private and social sectors, the creation of new 
ventures to deliver goods and services not yet supplied by existing markets, or new modes of 
finance, perhaps combined with aid or philanthropy (Richey and Ponte 2011; Elkington and 
Hartigan 2008, 3).  
 
The idea of social entrepreneurship in development has been driven, on the one hand, by the 
process of privatisation started with SAPs and, on the other, by the increasing focus on social 
objectives such as poverty reduction following the adoption of the MDGs. The framework 
provided by the MDGs and replaced by the SDGs has emphasised the importance of new 
business models, partnerships and financial instruments in development with a key role for the 
private sector, namely any organisation engaging in commerce and trade from start-ups to 
multinational corporations (Blowfield and Dolan 2014, 23). The idea of inclusive business as 
a development strategy was introduced by the UNDP in 2004 with the report Unleashing 
Entrepreneurship: Making Business Work for the Poor and reiterated in 2006 with Growing 
Inclusive Market Initiative: Business Works for Development and Development Works for 
Business, and was later embraced by the World Bank through the International Financial 
Corporation and by private-sector-centred institutions such as the WEF.  
 
The private sector’s involvement in development is generally associated with the potential for 
creating jobs, introducing innovation and efficiency and attracting funds in the form of 
investment and donations. This often means to reframing problems related to poverty as into 
business opportunities, and requires partnership with “development experts”, aid agencies or 
philanthropic foundations, but also with local entrepreneurs and NGOs to better understand the 
habits and behaviours of beneficiaries/consumers (Blowfield and Dolan 2014, 32). This 
approach considers the poor as creative entrepreneurs and legitimises the idea that poor people 
constitute a potential market that is not served or is under-served by the private sector, echoing 
Prahalad’s so-called bottom-of-the-pyramid (BoP) approach (Prahalad 2004). The role of 
business and “collaborative partnerships” in development has been supported by international 
figures from Muhammad Yunus to Bill Gates and has been fully embraced by the UN’s 2030 
agenda for Sustainable Development (Adams and Pingeot 2013). Finance is a key aspect of the 
increasing involvement of the private sector in development both in terms of developing new 
ways of “financing for development” and providing poor and low-income people with 





Yunus, who in 2006 won the Nobel Peace Prize for founding the Grameen Bank and pioneering 
the idea of microcredit, adopts the concept of social business in relation to microcredit 
programmes (Yunus 2008; Yunus and Weber 2010). He assumes a link between microcredit 
and poverty reduction, and considers the business model as necessary to generate enough 
income to cover the cost of lending money to the poor. In other words, he proposes a market-
based solution to poverty while giving a fundamental role to philanthropy. The link between 
philanthropy and business has also been theorised by the Harvard business scholar Porter and 
the corporate lawyer Kramer, who coined the concept “shared value”, namely to pursue a 
philanthropic strategy that align with a corporation’s commercial interests (Porter and Kramer 
1999, 2006, 2011). Differently from Yunus’ approach, creating value means creating profit for 
the business owners, and in so doing, contributing to social objectives: creating jobs, providing 
goods and services and helping to fund social projects. According to this model, financial 
access for the poor should not be seen as a mere social obligation but as a “win-win logic” 
(Porter and Kramer 2011). 
 
The idea of combining business interests with philanthropy also defines Bill Gates’ concept of 
“creative capitalism”, which focuses on how consumer-based technology can facilitate 
innovation and how philanthropic foundations can offer incentives to companies to create and 
deliver new products and services for the poor (Gates and Kiviat 2008; Kinsley 2008). More 
recently, this idea has found expression in the narrative of “philanthrocapitalism”, a method of 
philanthropy that emulates for-profit business in the capitalist world (Bishop and Green 2008). 
Philanthrocapitalists are predominantly entrepreneurs such as Bill Gates, Mark Zuckerberg, 
Jeffrey Skoll, Marcus Goldman and Samuel Sachs, who have made fortunes in the tech or 
financial industries, and are driven by the aim to bring innovative financing models and new 
performance metrics to philanthropy, making it more efficient and lucrative (McGoey 2014: 
111). 
 
Among philanthrocapitalist foundations, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation stands out for 
its wealth and public support from governments, international organisations, corporations and 
celebrities. The majority of the fortune that Gates has accumulated via his business at Microsoft 
supports the philanthropic projects of the Gates Foundation. Financial inclusion is one of the 
current priorities of the Foundation, it has partnered with a variety of institutions to launch 




Kenya has invested in mobile money projects. For instance, in 2010 the Foundation offered a 
non-repayable grant of $4.8 million, followed by $2.9 million the following year, to Vodacom, 
a Vodafone subsidiary in Tanzania, to enable the company to start its own M-Pesa project.6 
The Foundation has also been indirectly involved in shaping the global agenda on financial 
inclusion by funding the institutions that are leading the debate on the regulation of digital 
financial inclusion such as AFI and the mobile money programme at GSMA. The narrative of 
philanthrocapitalism demonstrates how philanthropic foundations contribute to mobile money 
projects with the aim to create entrepreneurial opportunities for poor and low-income people 
to improving their livelihood and for MNO to making profits. The focus on entrepreneurial 
opportunities is preferred over the provisioning of social welfare and public access to resources 
as another way of improving livelihoods.  
 
 
3. The Institutional and Regulatory Arrangements of M-Pesa 
The idea of M-Pesa originated from the informal practice of transferring prepaid airtime and 
its institutionalisation into a money transfer service has been realised via a public-private 
partnership between DFID and Vodafone, and involved Vodafone’s local partner Safaricom 
and other local and international institutions. This section will examine the institutional and 
regulatory arrangements that have contributed to the development of M-Pesa as a social 
entrepreneurship project for financial inclusion, looking at the “interconnectedness” of the 
social, economic and legal elements of its infrastructure. 
 
3.1 The M-Pesa Public-Private Partnership  
According to Nick Hughes (Hughes and Lonie 2007, 66), the former head of Social Enterprise 
at Vodafone, the public-private partnership to realise M-Pesa originated at the World Summit 
on Sustainable Development in 2002, when he had the opportunity to discuss with DFID 
representatives the idea of developing a mobile-phone-enabled money transfer system to tackle 
financial exclusion. In Hughes’s view, private organisations like Vodafone are legally bound 
to use their shareholders’ capital to achieve immediate returns, and for this reason they do not 
usually commit themselves to long-term development projects whose gains are not assured. He 
                                               
6See < http://www.gatesfoundation.org/Media-Center/Press-Releases/2010/11/Vodacom-gets-US-48-Million-to-




pointed out how public-private partnerships could circumvent this issue and allow long-term 
development projects combining profit with social objectives (Hughes and Lonie 2007, 66).  
 
DFID, the UK government sector that manages aid and funds research and projects for 
international development, had established in the late 1990s the Financial Deepening Challenge 
Fund (FDCF), as part of its commitment to contribute to the realisation of the MDGs. The 
FDCF supported the belief that the MDGs could not be achieved without significant private-
sector participation in activities contributing to poverty reduction, including financial 
inclusion.7 Inherent in this belief was the expectation that the private sector is generally likely 
to commit to development projects with a strong commercial incentive. The FDCF was an 
attempt to find new partnership-based mechanisms that would enable this type of commitment, 
and was conceived to encourage commercial financial institutions to engage in risk-sharing 
partnerships with DFID.8 Its main purpose was to develop commercially-viable financial 
services that would benefit the poor, and in particular the “economically active poor”.  
 
DFID also initiated another project to support the development of financial markets more 
specifically in the African context with the creation of the Financial Sector Deepening Trusts 
(FSD). The FSD was designed to work directly with private-sector institutions as well as with 
governments and donors to address constraints to financial inclusion. The first and most 
relevant FSD was established in Kenya in 2005 and attracted funding from the World Bank, 
French Development Agency, the Swedish International Development Agency and the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation for its key role in coordinating research and projects on financial 
development in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Besides these projects specifically focusing on finance, from 2001 DFID also funded a series 
of studies in Africa investigating the relationship between new information technologies and 
poverty reduction, which revealed the potential for using the mobile phone network 
infrastructure to facilitate financial transactions (McKemey et al 2003). These studies 
documented the practice that inspired M-Pesa: transferring prepaid airtime and using it as a 
virtual currency (Batchelor 2005). This practice consists of users buy a prepaid scratch card 
                                               
7 DFID (Financial Sector Team, Policy Division), “Financial Deepening Challenge Fund: Strategic Project 
Review”, December 2005.  





and text the code to someone to whom they need to transfer money, who then enters the code 
to use the airtime or can choose to sell the code on to another person or to a merchant in 
exchange for cash or some other commodity or service (Ray 2007; Maurer 2012, 589–604).  
 
Vodafone and DFID decided to collaborate to develop a mobile phone-enabled financial 
service: Vodafone was awarded a FDCF of 1 million GBP, which matched with an equal 
combination of cash and staff time. The project aimed to fill a niche in the market by serving 
those with no access to formal financial services, the so-called “unbanked poor”, and in this 
way to also contribute to the MDGs via financial inclusion (Hughes and Lonie 2007). One of 
FDCF target zones was East Africa, and Kenya seemed a likely option as both DFID and 
Vodafone already had a relevant presence in the country. DFID had institutional links because 
of the UK colonial history and Vodafone’s local partner, Safaricom (owned by Vodafone for 
40 per cent), had 75 per cent share of the mobile phone market at the time and a strong brand 
presence (Owino and Tanui 2011). Also local institutions, particularly the Central Bank of 
Kenya (CBK), expressed a willingness to collaborate on a project aimed at financial inclusion. 
The funding was followed by field research to develop the M-Pesa digital, physical and legal 
infrastructure.  
 
Vodafone commissioned the development of the M-Pesa software to Scientific Generics (now 
Sagentia), a consultancy firm based in the UK. Many of the available financial service 
platforms had been designed for integration with Western banking infrastructures and could 
only add new channels via which customers could access their bank accounts. However, M-
Pesa was intended not as a banking service but as a mobile network operator (MNO)-based 
service outside the banking infrastructure, so its functionality needed to be integrated with 
MNO products and services (Wooder and Baker 2012). The software was developed around 
the well-known and widely-available SMS technology to allow the system to be used on basic, 
black-and-white mobile phones. M-Pesa was situated on the SIM card and linked to the mobile 
number, and the system was designed in both English and Swahili to be used by people living 
in the rural areas.  
 
Vodafone and DFID initially intended M-Pesa as a system to facilitate microfinance 
transactions, but following a pilot to test its functionality it became clear that most customers 
were more interested in a low-cost payment service. M-Pesa had to facilitate the transfer of 




money to other users, whether people or institutions, for which the payer would pay a fee 
proportionate to the amount transferred; and the conversion of e-money back into cash, for 
which the payee would pay a fee. To do this Vodafone and DFID relied on Safaricom’s well-
established network of airtime dealer outlets, using them as mobile money agents where 
consumers could go to open an M-Pesa account and convert cash into e-money and vice versa.  
 
3.2 The Mobile Money Regulatory Arrangements  
When M-Pesa was being developed in 2005-2006, there was no regulation on mobile money 
and DFID, Vodafone and Safaricom, in consultation with CBK, had to make key regulatory 
decisions. They decided to keep the M-Pesa money in a trust account at the Commercial Bank 
of Africa, managed by the non-profit M-Pesa Holding Company.9 As M-Pesa is a money 
transfer system and not a banking service, customers remain in control of their electronic 
money at all time. There is no financial intermediation in banking terms between the M-Pesa 
customers and the mobile money agents. The agents do not perform bank credit assessments 
as deposit-taking banking institutions do, but just exchange cash for electronic money and vice-
versa. M-Pesa is not regulated as a “banking business”, which according to the Banking Act 
involves not only accepting money from the public but also “the employing of money held on 
deposit on current accounts, or any part of the money, by lending, investment or in any manner 
for the account and at the risk of the person so employing the money.”10 This also means that 
M-Pesa customers are not paid interest on the money kept in the M-Pesa account. The interest 
on customers’ deposits is paid to the M-Pesa Holding Company and managed by the M-Pesa 
Foundation, created in 2010 for this purpose as an independent charitable trust.11 The interest 
earned on these accounts are part of Safaricom philanthropic activities, which also means that 
no taxes are paid on them. There is a lack of clarity about who controls or can profit from the 
funds when they are sitting in the trust account (Malala 2018, 150).   
 
                                               
9 Declaration of Trust, M-Pesa Holding Co Limited, 23rd February 2007. As the size of the M-Pesa Trust 
account grew, the trustee in consultation with CBK decided to spread the funds across several banks to reduce 
the risk of single custodial bank or corruption. 
10 Laws of Kenya, Banking Act 1989 (as amended to 15th September 2015), Nairobi: Central Bank of Kenya. 
Part I section 2(C). 
11 M-Pesa Holding Co Limited Declaration of Trust 
<https://www.safaricom.co.ke/images/Downloads/Personal/M-




M-Pesa is a fee-based service. The fee itself has an important regulatory role defining access 
to the service and also represents a secure source of income for the MNO. The fee for each 
transaction is taken directly from the customer’s account as a fixed amount rather than a 
percentage of the transaction, making each transaction profitable for the MNO on a stand-alone 
basis. There is no charge for signing up to the service or for converting cash into e-money (i.e. 
cashing in, depositing money), and the charge for transferring e-money and reconverting it into 
cash (i.e. cashing out, withdrawing money) depends on the amount and whether the recipient 
is registered with M-Pesa.12  
 
After the launch of M-Pesa in 2007, CBK opted for a “test and learn” approach to the regulation 
of mobile money services.13 This means that while various audits were conducted to make sure 
that M-Pesa complied with international rules such as anti-money laundering (AML) and 
counter-terrorist financing (CTF), CBK supervised the service in partnership with the MNO, 
maintaining an openness to new financial services and providers.14 The CBK allowed 
Safaricom to operate under a special Communications Commission of Kenya licence without 
the need for a banking licence, and the Communications Act 1998 was amended in 2009 to 
recognise electronic transactions.15 This demonstrates how M-Pesa was created at the 
intersection between telecommunications and finance, requiring the CBK and the 
Communications Authority of Kenya to collaborate on its regulation. 
 
After conducting various legal and risk assessments and authorising two external audits, the 
CBK issued Safaricom with a Letter of No Objection (Muthiora 2015, 11). The letter 
represented M-Pesa’s regulatory framework from its launch in 2007 to 2014, when the National 
                                               
12 Fees for money transfers currently range from 11 KSH to send 101–500 KSH; 77 KSH to send 5,001–7,500 
KSH; and 105 to send 20,001–70,000 KSH, which is the maximum amount that can be transferred. With the 
latest changes to the fees structure there is no fee to transfer 1-100 KSH, but it costs 10 KSH to withdraw 50–
100 KSH, with a minimum withdrawal of 50 KSH. 1 KSH = 0,0099 USD. The full list of M-Pesa charges is 
available here < https://www.safaricom.co.ke/personal/m-pesa/getting-started/m-pesa-rates > accessed 2 May 
2019. 
13 This term was used by Njuguna Ngundu, governor of the Central Bank of Kenya from 2007 to 2015. See B. 
Muthiora, Enabling Mobile Money Policies in Kenya: Fostering a Digital Financial Revolution, London: 
GSMA, January 2015.  
14 See Alliance for Financial Inclusion, Case study: Enabling Mobile Money Transfers: The Central Bank of 
Kenya’s Treatment of M-Pesa, 2010 < https://www.afi-
global.org/sites/default/files/publications/afi_casestudy_mpesa_en.pdf > accessed 2 May 2019. 
15 Laws of Kenya, The Kenya Information and Communication Act 1998, Chapter 411 A. Rev. 2011. Electronic 




Payment System (NPS) Regulations were adopted by the National Treasury.16 The “test and 
learn” approach facilitated the rapid expansion of the service. The NPS Regulations codified 
the regulatory practices adopted by the CBK since the launch of M-Pesa and aimed to ensure 
the system’s integrity and security, but also to validate the mobile money social 
entrepreneurship model and favour the further expansion of the system by allowing both banks 
and non-banks to provide mobile money services, and mobile money providers to offer a 
variety of e-money products (Muthiora 2015, 20). While mobile money services in Kenya are 
currently provided by other MNOs besides Safaricom and by financial institutions, M-Pesa 
remains dominant with over 24 million subscriptions as in September 2018.17  
 
Since the launch of M-Pesa, Safaricom has become Kenya’s largest and most profitable 
company, making profits of USD 620 million in 2019.18 While Safaricom brands itself as 
distinctly Kenyan, and as the company that has brought first the mobile and then financial 
services to all Kenyans, it is important to consider that it is owned by the Kenyan government 
only for 35 per cent, 40 per cent is owned by Vodafone and the remaining 25 per cent of shares, 
sold by the government in 2008 for 52 billion KES (The Economist, 2008), are held in small 
tranches by a range of mainly foreign investors. Although it is still unclear whether the money 
contributed to public services, recent suggestions advanced by the Kenyan government to tax 
part of the M-Pesa revenue to fund a universal healthcare programme have been dismissed by 
Safaricom as against the purpose of financial inclusion (Kazeem 2018). As Bateman et al 
(2019) have observed this means that a relevant portion of the revenue produced by M-Pesa is 
not locally redistributed but repatriated back to shareholders in the UK and other countries, as 
a form of neo-colonial digital extraction (Bateman et al 2019, 7-8).  
 
This analysis demonstrates how the public-private financing of M-Pesa and its legal 
infrastructure have favoured the rapid expansion of the platforms. This has created an enabling 
environment for mobile money to growth and for providers to make profits. The analysis 
demonstrates that the revenue deriving from the use of the M-Pesa infrastructure and its funds 
                                               
16 The National Payment System Regulations 2014, Kenya Gazette Supplement no. 119, Legislative Supplement 
no. 43. 
17 Communications Authority of Kenya, data April-June 2018. https://ca.go.ke/wp-
content/uploads/2018/12/Sector-Statistics-Report-Q1-2018-2019.pdf accessed 14 July 2019. 
18 
https://www.safaricom.co.ke/images/Downloads/Resources_Downloads/FY2019/FY2019_Results_Presentatio




is not redistributed, for instance providing public access to needed resources and services. 
However, possible rewards are offered through opportunities, leaving the responsibility for and 
risks inherent in taking advantage of them to the users, raising some questions about the 
“social” implications of the M-Pesa social enterprise. 
 
4. The “Social” Dimension of the Mobile Money Enterprise  
As seen, M-Pesa is premised on the idea of social entrepreneurship, combining business 
interests with social objectives. In M-Pesa the business value is represented by the fees paid by 
customers to use the service, the interests earned on the M-Pesa accounts, and the monetary 
and reputational gains for Safaricom and Vodafone. The social value is represented by financial 
inclusion and the potential economic growth and social gains that mobile money projects could 
bring. While M-Pesa is formally a payment service for “all Kenyans”, its social impact is 
primarily related to the benefits it can bring to poor and low-income people and its possible 
contribution to the SDGs, such as access to clean water, healthcare, and affordable energy. 
These benefits are considered achievable through a mix of entrepreneurship, philanthropy, and 
partnerships seeking to extend opportunities to access financial capital, goods and services to 
poor consumers.  
 
Some of these opportunities are offered via the projects managed by the M-Pesa Foundation 
which, as mentioned, are funded with the interests produced by the M-Pesa customers deposits 
which are held by the M-Pesa Holding Company. Other opportunities are offered via mobile 
money-based products and services in line with the narrative of social entrepreneurship. Here 
Safaricom, as the MNO, provides the channel through which money moves, corporations and 
philanthropic foundations provide expertise and funding to develop the projects (Maurer 2015, 
22). The purpose of these products and services is to facilitate access to finance for the 
unbanked poor, while also offering them the opportunity to access basic resources that are paid 
for via the M-Pesa platform in small and flexible instalments suitable for poor consumers with 
small and irregular income. This section analyses three mobile money-enabled products: M-
KOPA, Grundfos-Lifelink and HELP. 
 
M-Kopa was founded in 2011 by the same Nick Hugh, the former head of social enterprise at 
Vodafone, who started M-Pesa, M-Kopa has been defined as “the global leader of “pay-as-




quality solutions affordable to everyone”.19 Premised on the concept of sustainable 
development aligning with the SDGs, M-Kopa is a micro-solar system consisting of a base 
station with a solar panel, three lamps and a charging kit for mobile phones. It was developed 
via a partnership between Safaricom, entrepreneurs, and donors initially including the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation, DFID and the Shell Foundation and more recently venture 
companies such as Gray Ghost Social Ventures, LGT Impact Ventures and Generation 
Investment Management. The donors and companies provide resources to develop the system, 
which is offered on a credit basis to be repaid via the M-Pesa or other mobile money platforms 
(kopa itself means “to borrow” in Swahili). For customers the electrical system costs about 
18,999 KES (about 186 US dollars), which includes a deposit of 2,999 KES (about 30 US 
dollars) and daily payments of 50 KES (about 0,50 US dollars) for one year, made through M-
Pesa, and more recently also through other mobile money systems. Customers can use the 
system as long as they keep up their payments, and after a year, when all the payments have 
been made, the customer owns the solar system. This product aims to rely on the mobile money 
infrastructure to “make solar products affordable to low-income households on a pay-per-use 
instalment plan” and promotes access to solar power as instrumental to increased opportunities 
for work and children’s education. M-Kopa also offers other products on credit such as a tank 
that stores rainwater, a smartphone, a television and offers loans to pay for school fees, allowing 
small and flexible repayments.  
 
Another such product is Grundfos-Lifelink, a project developed by the Danish water-pump 
manufacturing company Grundfos with the purpose to deliver water systems and associated 
infrastructure to low-income markets, combining existing water service technologies with 
innovation in business models and payment methods. The project was piloted in 2009 in the 
rural semi-arid community of Katitika and relied on the M-Pesa payment system.20 As Patricia 
Kameri-Mbote (Kameri-Mbote and Cullet 1997, 23) points out, in understanding water 
constraints in countries like Kenya we need to recognise how the colonial rule, attempts to 
modernisation and development programmes such as SAPs affected access to water, 
particularly among rural communities. K’Akumu (2004, 213) explains that after independence 
the process of privatising water began with the adoption of the 2002 Water Act under IMF 
conditions, particularly affecting low-income people in rural slums and other rural areas who 
                                               
19 M-Kopa <http://www.m-kopa.com/  > accessed 10 March 2018. 
20 Grundus-Lifelink project <http://www.grundfos.com/cases/find-case/grundfos-lifelink-projects-in-kenya.html 




could not afford to pay for clean water. The Grundfos-Lifelink project aimed to address these 
problems by adopting a social entrepreneurship logic. Grundfos established the company 
Grundfos-Lifelink Kenya, a joint venture between Grundfos and the Danish Investment Fund 
for Development Countries, which concluded a partnership with Safaricom to provide villagers 
the opportunity to buy clean water from a community water pump with micropayments. In rural 
areas like Katitika, the upfront cost of the system needs to be funded by an external donor from 
the public sector, development organisations, philanthropic foundations or corporate social 
responsibility programmes while the everyday water consumption finances the service and 
maintenance. Villagers have to transfer money through M-Pesa or other mobile money services 
to a smart key bob that could be used to draw water from solar-powered water pumps. 
According to the pilot’s final report, one of the system’s main objectives was to save villagers 
time and money and help them to start micro-businesses such as making bricks, cultivating 
kitchen gardens and tree nurseries, and selling bottled water in other villages from jerry cans.21  
 
Projects related to healthcare include the Health Enablement and Learning Platform, HELP, a 
mobile phone-enabled programme to provide online training to community health workers in 
three areas: Kenya’s Kibera slum, the rural district of Mwingi, and the Samburu pastoralist 
region. This project is a partnership between Amref Health Africa, the M-Pesa Foundation, 
Kenya’s Ministry of Health, Accenture Development Partnerships and Safaricom. The training 
is delivered according to a pedagogical model approved by the Ministry of Health, and the aim 
is to provide local volunteers with health-related mobile-phone-based training before putting 
them in charge of passing on the information to community members and providing support in 
emergencies.22 Another project is Changamka Microhealth, an integrated health/finance 
company providing financing mechanisms for low-income people. It offers a medical savings 
plan for outpatients, and maternity health care. Customers use M-Pesa to save small 
contributions to a smart card which locks the money in to be used when needed.23 To promote 
this service, customers using the smart card are eligible for a discount at selected clinics.  
 
                                               
21 S. Haas and G. Nagarajan, “Water Delivery Through Payment Platform: M-PESA Pushes the Rural 
Frontiers”, Financial Services Assessment, 2011. 
22  Health Enablement and Learning Platform project: 
 <http://www.m-pesafoundation.org/projects/improving-community-health/ > accessed 10 March 2018. 




These examples represent a very small part of the complex “mobile money ecosystem” in 
Kenya (Kendall et al 2012, 49–64). There are numerous mobile money-enabled projects and 
apparently infinite possibilities for new ones. Some aim to address core development priorities 
such as clean water, healthcare and electricity, and can be considered useful in the absence of 
publicly provided access to basic resources and services. However, it is important to highlight 
that while these ideas are appealing, not all poor people can access or successfully use most of 
the programmes, not only because they need a mobile phone and a mobile money account but 
also because of the initial deposit necessary to access some of the services, and the daily or 
weekly commitment to pay. These products and services delivered through M-Pesa depend not 
on only on people’s ability to access the service but also on the resources to take advantage of 
them: most people who are financially excluded do not have a regular source of income.24 Some 
of the projects such as Grundfos-Lifelink are also limited to particular areas depending on the 
partnerships and the partners’ interests, automatically excluding people living in other areas.25 
In addition to these issues, these projects provide limited and fractioned access to electricity 
and water and for this reason their long-term benefit to poor people are often questionable. 
While of course different mobile money projects can have a different impact on particular local 
groups and areas, it is important to make some overall considerations on the social implications 
of mobile money-based products and services.  
 
M-Pesa started as a project for financial inclusion, and all of the products and services 
developed on its platform have been tied to this main objective. Mobile money services have 
made access to basic resources conditional on access to finance, and have also reinforced the 
idea of financial inclusion as instrumental in the achievement of social objectives. However, 
as basic resources and services are sold through the M-Pesa infrastructure and purchasable 
through mobile financial services they become formalised, marketised and financialised. This 
also means that as the number of people “financially included” increases, livelihoods become 
dependent on the market and on integration within financial circuits. While poor people might 
have more opportunities to access clean water and legal energy, they also become the target of 
private profit. The financialisation of resources puts profit ahead of social welfare and basic 
                                               
24 Focus group in Kawangware, Nairobi 28 November 2012, 2 December 2012; Mathare, 4 December 2012; 
Ngango 8 and 9 December 2012. According to the FSD and CBK FinAccess Survey conducted in 2006 the 
reasons for financial exclusion are lack of income (58.9 per cent) and lack of regular income (31.6 per cent). 
Similarly, the 2016 FinAccess survey (FSD 2007, 2016) shows that the main reason for stopping using a bank 
account was loss of income source (39.4 per cent). 




needs (Fraser 2014, 546). In the mobile money social enterprise basic resources can be bought 
on credit or through savings schemes, to be repaid in small and/or flexible instalments and, 
depending on the amount transferred, involve a fee to the MNO. At the same time, the emphasis 
on micro-entrepreneurship encouraged among users such as the Katitika villagers and M-
KOPA customers is used to invest them with the pressure and responsibility to transform the 
opportunities offered via mobile money into improved livelihood.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Digital financial inclusion as a development policy has gathered pace in parallel with the 
increasing influence of the narrative of social entrepreneurship in international development. 
This article has examined the limits of this narrative in the case of M-Pesa in Kenya, one of the 
most successful digital financial inclusion projects to date. The first section has analysed the 
link between financial inclusion and social entrepreneurship by looking at various articulations 
of this narrative such as bottom of the pyramid (BoP) approach, social business, shared value, 
creative capitalism and the increasingly dominant idea of philanthrocapitalism, a method of 
philanthropy that emulates for-profit business activities while encouraging poor people to take 
responsibility for their own development. The second section has illustrated the institutional 
arrangements and legal infrastructure that have contributed to the rapid expansion of M-Pesa 
and proliferation of mobile money providers and services, and how the revenue produced via 
M-Pesa goes mainly to Vodafone, Safaricom and the M-Pesa shareholders. The third section 
has examined three mobile money-enabled projects, M-KOPA, Grundfos-Lifelink and HELP, 
and their social implications. It has pointed out that the main obstacles to access these projects 
are lack of income and regular income, which are also major causes of financial exclusion, and 
that they can be a means for the individualization of responsibility and financialisation of social 
problems.  
 
Two key considerations can be done in relation to the analysis of the mobile money enterprise. 
The first is that mobile money legitimises a win-win “business ontology” (Fisher 2009, 17), 
typical of Western capitalism, according to which everything in society should be run on a 
business model to bring profits for the private sector, benefits for people and prosperity for the 
country. This business logic increasingly makes use of the word “social” mirroring the 
inclusion of “social goals” in the mainstream development agenda. While in relation to 
business “social” was initially used to refer to amendments and reparations for corporate abuse 




evidence of social value as demonstrated by its expansion to rural and slum areas of the Global 
South (McGoey 2015, 84). In the case of M-Pesa, the growth of Safaricom as a Kenyan 
corporation (although it is 40 per cent owned by Vodafone), its social projects and commitment 
to social objectives have contributed to promoting a narrative of corporations bringing not only 
capital but also, and particularly, social value (Benerjee, 2008). This idea of social value has 
been realised within the frameworks provided by international institutions such as the UN, the 
IMF and the World Bank and embraced by institutions such as FSD Kenya and AFI that claim 
to represent the interests of the Global South. These frameworks, however, fail to recognise 
unequal structural conditions of the economy shaped by colonialism and development 
discourses (Ferguson 2006), and present mobile money as a quick fix to complex socio-
economic problems, often taking attention away from the issues that cause and reproduce 
financial exclusion itself.  
 
The second, and perhaps most important, reflection in order to distinguish the “social” label of 
the mobile money enterprise from its actual social implications, is the way in which the various 
forms of revenue deriving from and attracted by M-Pesa are used. The M-Pesa platform has 
focused on providing the unbanked poor with the opportunity to access a variety of mobile 
money services, rather than contributing to measures for providing them with the resources 
necessary to take advantage of these opportunities. For instance, the M-Pesa revenue and 
philanthropic funding are not redistributed via the provisioning of public services and social 
infrastructure. The possibility to use the M-Pesa profits to provide publicly available resources 
and services instead of entrepreneurial projects funded by the M-Pesa Foundation has not been 
considered. The profits and funds generated by the rapid development of M-Pesa, to which 
poor and low-income users have greatly contributed, have not been locally redistributed. They 
have not been used to provide free access to basic resources and services such as water, 
electricity, healthcare and education, with a potential greater impact on the socio-economic 
disadvantages that cause financial exclusion and reproduce social inequality. Opportunities to 
access basic resources and services have been offered via the mobile money market, leaving 
the responsibility for and risks inherent in taking advantage of these to the designated 
beneficiaries, the unbanked poor. This paper argues that the M-Pesa social enterprise promotes 
an approach to digital financial inclusion based on the proliferation of financialised fee-based 
opportunities rather than on redistributive measures aimed at providing the unbanked poor with 
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